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NOTES
PHYSICIAN OWNERSHIP IN PHARMACrES
We fix and ordain - to prevent any pharmacist from having tempta-
tation or reason for sinning - that no pharmacist may keep shop in partner-
ship or agreement with any physician.
-Genoa Legal Code of 1407
With purity and holiness I will pass my life and practice my art....
Into whatever houses I enter I will go into them for the benefit of the sick
,'and will abstain from ev'ery voluntary act of mischief and corruption.
* -Hippocratic Oath
I. Introduction
In 1950, seven pharmacies served the citizens of Coffeyville, Kansas (popu-
lation, 17,113). Of these, four were owned by registered pharmacists, two by
local businessmen, and one was owned by a group of doctors and their wives.
Today, there are nine pharmacies in Coffeyville (population approximately
17,500). Three of these are partially or completely owned by a total of seven
doctors" practicing in the community.'
Druggist X, the owner of one of the original seven pharmacies in the city,
earns a large part of his income by filling drug prescriptions. Doctor Y is a
successful general practitioner in Coffeyville. In 1957, Druggist X filled an
average of 57 prescriptions per month for Doctor Y's patients. In the following
year, Doctor Y joined two other local physicians in opening their own pharmacy
in the medical building they owned and occupied. Soon thereafter, the average
number of Doctor Y's prescriptions filled by Druggist X fell to 29 per month,
and in 1963 to only 11 per month, a drop of 81 per cent.
In contrast, in 1957 Druggist X filled an average of 41 prescriptions per
month written by Doctor Z, and this rose to an average of 50 in" 1958, and 77
in. 1963, an increase of over 87 per cent. Doctor Z is an independent practitioner
who has no interest in any pharmacy.
In cities and towns across the country, the number of pharmacies owned
by physicians is slowly increasing. In Texas, for example, there were approxi-
mately 66 of these pharmacies in 1960. The number rose to.93 in 1962, and
today there are approximately 117.2 Physicians in California owned 39 phar-
macies in 1949, 213 in 1962, and between February of 1962 and February of
1963 an additional 39 such pharmacies were registered with the state pharmacy
board.8 Similarly, although there were only 5 physician-owned pharmacies
in Wisconsin prior to 1950, their number increased to 12 in 1960, and 24 in
1 These and the following statistics concerning the pharmacy business in Coffeyville,
Kansas, are found in, Statement of Jack R. Issacs, Pharmacist, Coffeyville, Kansas, Hearings
on Physician Ownership in Pharmacies and Drug Companies Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 175-77 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
2 Statement of Joe H. Arnette, Secretary, Texas State Board of Pharmacy, Hearings, 6.
3 Statement of Benjamin J. Kingwell, President, California Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Hear-
ings, 163.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
1964. 4 In the latter state, all but one of these pharmacies are found in com-
munities which have pharmaceutical services available through other licensed
pharmacies.5
Although these figures represent a small percentage of the total number of
pharmacies in these states they do indicate a trend which could create serious
problems for the nation's independent druggists. Several states have been suf-
ficiently alarmed by this possibility to pass recent legislation prohibiting or reg-
ulating physician ownership of pharmacies.6 The problem also became im-
portant enough to attract the attention of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly. In August of 1964, hearings were held to consider the possible
antitrust implications of doctor-owned pharmacies and the similar problem of
physician ownership in drug companies. This note will consider only the former
problem of physician-owned pharmacies.
A brief history of the growth and decline of pharmacy as a profession
serves as a good starting point for the discussion. In the early days of the prac-
tice of the healing arts in this country, men looked to the physician not only
to diagnose and treat their ills, but to dispense necessary medication as well-
Pharmacists were still few in number and unrecognized as a professional group-
As pharmacy grew in stature, schools of pharmacy were established, the number
of trained pharmacists increased, and pharmacy was able to offer its services to
the physician and to the public on a wider scale. At a time when most drugs
had to be compounded, the physician found it to his benefit to turn over this
time-consuming task to the local pharmacist, thereby also eliminating his costly
inventory of drugs. It was recognized that the public was best served if the
responsibility for diagnosing and treating the disease fell exclusively to the
physician, and that of preparing, compounding and dispensing the medication
was left to the pharmacist. At an early date it was also recognized that it was
consonant with the trust and confidence reposed in each by the community
that they operate independently and fee splitting between the two practitioners
was prohibited.'
Although pharmacy was considered a profession by some, it never attained.
the status enjoyed by the attorney or the physician. Unlike these professionals,
a pharmacist could be hired, and his services sold to the public. As the prepara-
tion and compounding of drugs moved from the apothecary shop to the factory,
and the pharmacist introduced ice cream, magazines, and greeting cards into.
his inventory, he lost a great deal of his professional distinction and came to be
thought of as more of a businessman than a professional. Although many state-
4 Statement of Paul A. Pumpian, Secretary, Wisconsin State Board of Pharmacy, Hearings,.
211.
5 Id. at 204.
6 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 654; MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 266A(c) (4) (iii) (Supp.
1964); N.D. CENT. CODE 43-15-35(5) (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 390-5(9)
(xii) (Supp. 1964). Michigan is apparently the only state which requires ownership of phar-.
macies by pharmacists. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.771 (1956). This law was first enacted in 1929.
7 Statement of Dr. William S. Apple, Executive Director, American Pharmaceutical Ass'n,
Hearings, 187. Although the majority of the pharmacies in the United States in 1852 were:
physician-owned, this apparently was not looked upon as fee splitting. Id. at 195.
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statutes declared pharmacy to be a profession and provided that the license
of a pharmacist could be revoked for unprofessional conduct," many others
looked upon it as more of a trade and regarded the pharmacist as little more
than a pill salesman.
Due in part to .the uncertainty of the professional status of the pharmacist,
complete separation between the pharmacist and the physician never became a
reality. Pharmacy never became a true profession, and never attained the station
enjoyed by medicine. Indicative of this is the fact that it is considered per-
missible for the physician to dispense drugs in his office to his own patients. Since
this practice is not viewed as an invasion of a different professional field, no
limitations are placed upon the types or quantities of drugs the physician may
dispense in this manner, and the pharmacist thereby loses a fair percentage of
the prescription market.'
As the drug market expanded, and profits became greater," it was only
natural for some physicians to look to pharmacy as a profitable investment. Since
they dealt with drugs and knew their prices and ingredients, they understood a
great deal about pharmacy and the business of running a drugstore. By pur-
chasing an establishment, and hiring a registered pharmacist to manage the
business and dispense the drugs, these physicians could reap the profits of drug
sales without undergoing the inconveniences and disadvantages of storing drugs
in their own offices. As more and more physicians invested in pharmacies, and
some unscrupulous doctors contrived methods to channel their own prescriptions
to the pharmacies that they owned," the independent pharmacist realized that
his livelihood was being threatened by forces which were beyond his control. It
was this realization which brought the attention of the two professions and the
federal government to focus on the problem.
8 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.06(6) (e) (Supp. 1964) ; N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 6804.
9 In 1929, pharmacies dispensed 74% of the wholesale value of prescription drugs while
hospitals and dispensaries accounted for 13%. An additional 13% was dispensed by doctors.
In 1956, pharmacies accounted for only 56% of the value of total sales, while 24% were at-
tributable to hospitals and 20% to physicians. SOMERS & SOMERS, DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND
HEALTH INSURANcE 94 (1961); KRAMER, Drugs and Medicines, PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS
932 (1958).
10 In 1929, retail prescription sales were $140 million, while in 1956 they rose to $1.5
billion, an increase of almost 1,000%. Prescriptions rose from approximately 10% of total
drugstore sales to about one third. KRAMER, supra note 9, at 932.
In 1958 the 53,000 retail pharmacists in the United States filled 655,550,000
prescriptions-about 56 percent of which were new prescriptions, and the balance,
refills. In 1959, they filled 711,660,000-an increase of nearly 9 percent, while the
population rose less than 2 percent.
The number of prescriptions per family has jumped from 8 per year in 1954 to
more than 11 in 1959, and the average annual expenditure per family for prescrip-
tions has soared from $20 to $32.50 in the same 6-year period. In the 10-year period,
1949 to 1959, the annual number of prescriptions per doctor jumped from about 1,700
to more than 2,500.
Prescribed drugs are now one of the most significant items in the cost of medical
care, accounting for $1 out of every $5 spent for medical services. "The Consumer's
Stake in Drugs," Office of Research, Nationwide Ins. Co., Columbus, Ohio, Hearings,
266.
11 See text accompanying notes 16-19 infra.
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II. Economic and Ethical Aspects of Physician-Owned Pharmacies
A. The Economic Problem
There are commonly three types of physician-owned pharmacies: (a) a
pharmacy completely or partially owned by the physician and registered in his
or his partner's name; (b) a pharmacy where control and ownership is vested
in the doctor's immediate family; (c) a pharmacy owned by physicians engaged
in a group practice wherein space is leased to the pharmacist at a very high rent
or with a percentage lease. All of these forms of ownership create situations
in which it is tempting to the physician to in some way influence his patient
to have his prescription filled at the pharmacy in which he has an interest.
Although today's pharmacist has turned to the sale of many items besides drugs
to supplement his income, the profit on drugs is still high,'2 and a large per-
centage of the pharmacist's income depends on the number of prescriptions he
fills each year. So long as the buyer is able to exercise his free choice as to which
pharmacy he will patronize," the independent druggist's prescription sales will
remain fairly constant and he will be able to compete with doctor-owned
pharmacies on a more or less equal basis. However, if the free choice of the
patient is interfered with, and he is steered to a certain pharmacy by the doctor
who writes the prescription, the independent druggist suffers.
The greatest threat to the independent druggist is undoubtedly the clinic-
owned pharmacy. Today, it is not unusual to find medical clinics of various
sizes in even the smallest of communities. In large cities, clinics with as many
as- thirty doctors are not uncommon. Like the modern shopping plaza, the
medical clinic is a great convenience to the patient because it enables him to
obtain most of his medical services under one roof. When a clinic is established
in a certain locale, the prescription business which results can be a great boon
to local pharmacies. However, if the clinic also has its own pharmacy, it cuts
sharply into the trade of the local pharmacist, much as the plaza supermarket
injures the independent corner grocer.
However, a distinction must be made between clinic pharmacies in which
the pharmacist leases space at a reasonable yearly rental, and those in which
the pharmacist is merely an employee of a group of physicians or leases space
at a very high yearly rental or a percentage of the gross.' 4 In the former instance,
the physicians have nothing to gain by steering their patients to the clinical
pharmacy, and the free choice of the patients is usually not interfered with,
and the local pharmacy can still compete with the clinic pharmacy albeit the
latter has the better location. In the latter situation however, the physician
12 "For example, on 25 mg. chlorpromazine tablets, the price to the druggist in 1959 was
$3.03, the price to the consumer $5.05; on prochlorperazine, the prices were respectively, $3.93
and $6.55." TALALAY, DRUGS IN OUR SOCIETY 177 (1964).
13 In 1963, the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association stated that the
patient is entitled to a copy of his prescription and has the right to have it filled wherever he
wishes. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OPINIONS AND REPORTS 6
(1964). [Hereinafter cited AMA COUNCIL REPORTS.]
14 The lease of a pharmacy based on a percentage of the profits has been declared unethical
by the American Medical Association. Id. at 50.
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stands to profit by directing his patients to the pharmacy, and there is the pos-
sibility that the local pharmacists' business will be injured.
To a certain extent, both !physicians and pharmacists have a monopoly
over the prescription trade byvirtue of their licenses to practice. Ethical drugs
may be purchased only with a doctor's prescription and only a registered phar-
macist may fill that prescription.' To a certain extent, the patient is a captive
consumer. The doctor dictates what brand the patient must buy, and the phar-
macist is forbidden by law to substitute a different brand, even though it is
equal in quality or can be obtained at a cheaper price."0 Similarly, the doctor
orders.the amount of drugs and also prescribes in what quantities the medication
must be consumed. Derriand is exercised by he who 6rdeis and does not pay,
rather than by he who pays and consumes. The physician is able to exercise
this' extraordinary control because the patient fully realizes that he disobeys the
doctor's orders at the risk of his health. "There is, in fact, no other product or
service necessary to the maintenance of life that so completely escapes the ex-
ercise 'of consumer sovereignty as does the prescription drug in the circumstances
under which it is sold today."'  I I
; Piactically speaking, the only economik'fieedom the patient has is to de-
termine the pharmacy at which he will purchase his iedication, and if he wishes,
to shop at various pharmacies and inquire about prices before he makes his
decision. When this freedom is interfered with, the buyer becoiies a totally
captive consumer. If it -is the prescribing physician who exercises this final
control over his patient, his monopoly becomes- complete. Usually the totally
captive consumer does not realize that in addition to his charge for professional
services, the doctor is collecting profit from drug sales as well.,
There are many methods by which the physician may interfere with the
patient's free choice of pharmacies. Some of these are apparent attempts to
channel the buyer's prescription to a certain pharmacy. Other methods are more
subtle in influencing the patient's choice. The more notorious methods have been
declared unethical by the American Medical Association or the American
Pharmaceutical Association,"8 but the more cunning methodgsthrive on. Some
clearly unethical methods are:
(a) Coded prescriptions - By writing the prescription in code, the
physician forces the patient to have it filled by the druggist who understands the
code, and who is often the physician's employee or is splitting fees with him.
This practice has been declared unethical by both the AMA and the APhA.'9
(b) Direct telephone line to pharmacy - The'doctor's prescription is
phoned to a nearby pharmacy, and the patient is told where to pick up his medi-
cation. The AMA "looks with disfavor" upon this practice "on the theory that
a patient is entitled to a written prescription which he can take to the pharmacist
of his choice."2
15 Ethical drugs are to be distinguished from proprietary drugs which are sold without
prescriptions under brand names.
16 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.21 (1946); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6804(3)(k).
17 Rx Drugs: The Real Problem, 25 CONSUMER lRzps. 380-82 (1960).
18 Hereinafter referred to as the -AMA and the APhA respectively.
19 AMA COUNCIL REPORTS, 51-52; APHA CODE OF ETHICS, para. 14.
20 AMA COUNCIL REPORTS, 52.
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(c) Pneumatic tubes between doctor's office and pharmacy - Obviously,
this system is employed most effectively in a clinic. With a pharmacy directly
downstairs, the physician need only write the prescription or perhaps dictate it
to an assistant, and then send it down to the pharmacy to be filled. In some cases
the physician places the charge for drugs on his own bill. Although neither
the AMA or the APhA have expressly declared this practice to be unethical,
is is clear from what has been said thus far that it would be discouraged.
There are also more subtle methods by which the physician influences the
patient to have his prescription filled at the doctor's pharmacy. Some are dif-
ficult to determine because they employ subtle methods of persuasion and take
advantage of the doctor's great influence over the patient. Some of these more
prevalent methods are:
(a) Oral communication - The doctor usually instructs the patient,
"Have this filled at Doe's pharmacy down the street." Very often, the buyer
will comply with the doctor's wishes.
(b) Name of the pharmacy advertised on the prescription blank -
Again, the patient will very often believe that the advertised pharmacy is where
the doctor would like him to fill his prescription. The Judicial Council of the
AMA has said that prescription blanks should not include the name of any
pharmacy.2 1
A physician-owned pharmacy usually has an economic advantage over all
others. First, it does not have to stock as great an inventory of drugs as other
pharmacies because the doctor-owner can limit his prescription writing to drugs
which are in stock. Also, in some cases physicians may be given a professional
discount when they purchase drugs while the pharmacist must pay the higher
price.22 This means either that the doctor-owner can sell his drugs at a lower
price, or that he can sell them at the standard price and reap a greater profit.
Finally, the practicing physician receives a great deal of sample medication
through the mails.2" The unscrupulous practitioner may use these free samples
to fill prescriptions in his establishment.
Both the physician who owns the drugstore and the pharmacist who co-
operates with him are governed by professional codes of ethics promulgated by
professional organizations which represent most of their number. They are
thought to be governed by ethical standards and public responsibilities which
go beyond the minimum requirements of the law. To discuss the question of
physician ownership of pharmacies, it is necessary to consider not only the
economic effects of such ownership, but these ethical effects as well.
21 Statement of Robert B. Throckmorton, General Counsel, American Medical Ass'n, Hear-
ings, 218.
22 Statement of Paul A. Pumpian, Secretary, Wisconsin State Board of Pharmacy, Hear-
ings, 206.
23 Ibid. In 1963, the drug industry spent approximately $225,000,000 promoting its prod-
ucts to the approximately 200,000 physicians in the United States - more than $1,000 per
year per each physician. TALALAY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 145.
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B. The Ethical Problem
1. Conflicts of Professional and Commercial Interests
When a physician purchases a pharmacy whose business he can affect by
his own prescription writing, a definite conflict of interest develops. The con-
flict arises between the physician's duty to his patient and his natural desire for
financial gain. The relationship between a physician and his patients is in every
sense a fiduciary one of the highest trust and confidence. For the medical
practitioner, the very concept of professionalism contemplates the absence of
conflict between a physician's private interests and the interests of his patient.
"The prime object of the medical profession is to render service to humanity;
reward or financial gain is a subordinate consideration."24 Undoubtedly, the
large majority of practicing physicians live up to the high standards expected
of them, but, as is the case with every profession some do not, and these few
lower the status of the profession precisely wherein its strength lies - the respect
and confidence accorded to it by the public.
A physician who has no interest in where his prescriptions are filled may
be tempted to prescribe unnecessary medicine, or to prescribe a drug which
yields a greater margin of profit, or to keep the patient on drugs for an unneces-
sarily long period of time.
Of course, doctors resent the implication that they cannot be trusted to
own a pharmacy and conduct both it and their own practices for the public
welfare. The great majority of physicians have every right to be resentful. If
a patient places his trust and confidence in a doctor to use his knowledge, skill,
and judgment in prescribing medicines, should he also not trust the doctor not
to exploit him through such prescriptions? If a common businessman has the
right to own a pharmacy, should the dedicated physician be denied an equal
right? These are some of the questions posed by those inside the medical pro-
fession who assert that "the mere opportunity to exploit, the opportunity for
personal gain, should not in itself condemn [such ownership]."25
However, often a profession will declare a certain practice unethical not
because it is evil but because it creates the appearance of evil. Although some
would say that appearances should never condemn, they often do. It is sub-
mitted that a doctor-owned pharmacy is precisely the type of practice which
should be condemned solely because it fosters an appearance of evil and under-
mines the honor and dignity of the medical profession. This practice shakes the
confidence of the patient in both the physician and the pharmacist and creates
suspicions that they are merchandising medicine on an innocent public. It also
creates doubts in the minds of the public as to the value of the professional
services rendered, and the quality or quantity of medication prescribed. The
layman also tends to equate this practice with fee splitting. All of these suspicions
and doubts combine to injure the reputations of all physicians. To their discredit,
neither the AMA nor the APhA presently condemn physician-owned pharmacies.
24 AMA CouNcm R'oRTs, 3.
25 Statement of Robert B. Throckmorton, General Counsel, American Medical Ass'n, Hear-
ings, 219.
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In fact, the steps which the AMA has taken in revising its code of ethics to
allow this practice have only added to this appearance of evil.
2. The Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association
Among professional organizations, the AMA occupies an enviable position.
Its authority and influence over medical affairs is unique among such associa-
tions. The source of its power lies in its large membership and its considerable
financial backing. Since its formation in 1847, the AMA has promulgated a
code of ethics to govern the conduct of its member physicians with hopes of
elevating the standards of the entire profession and increasing public confi-
dence in it. One of these principles is that "physicians should recognize and
promote the practice of pharmacy as a profession... ."" Although in the main
the AMA has lived up to this principle, it does not presently look upon physician-
owned pharmacies as violative of either its letter or its spirit. This was not
always the case.
Prior to 1954, section VII of the Principles of Medical Ethics provided:
"An ethical physician does not engage in barter or trade in the appliances,
devices, or remedies prescribed for patients, but limits the source of his pro-
fessional income to professional service rendered the patient."2
In 1954, apparently in response to pressures created after the state of New
York discovered 187 physicians in undercover arrangements with druggists,"2
this section was amended to read: "It is unethical for a physician to participate
in the ownership of a drugstore in his medical practice area unless adequate
drugstore facilities are otherwise unavailable .. ."" Thus, at this time the
AMA took a definite stand on the issue. The practice of physician-owned
pharmacies was declared unethical, with a limited exception. However, approxi-
mately one year later, the above statement was dropped, and the following was
substituted: "It is not unethical for a physician to prescribe or supply drugs,
remedies, or appliances as long as there is no exploitation of the patient.""0 This
statement was again changed in 1957 to read: ". . . Drugs, remedies, or
appliances may be dispensed by the physician provided it is in the best interest
of the patient.""
In an attempt to clarify the import of this language, the judicial council
of the AMA issued a statement which explained that the phrase "in the best
interest of the patient" did not authorize the doctor to dispense drugs "solely
26 AMA COUNCIL REPORTS, 2.
27 Statement of Phillip F. Jehie, Associate General Counsel, National Ass'n of Retail Drug-
gists [hereinafter denoted NARD], Hearings, 150. The subsequent textual discussion of the evo-
lution of the AMA's pronouncements with regard to physician-owned pharmacies is documented
by references to the Hearings as well as by references to the actual AMA statements of these
ethical principles in order to give the reader the benefit of Mr. Jehle's interpretation of the evo-
lutionary cycle.
28 CARTER, THE DOCTOR BUSINESS, 133 (1958).
29 Statement of Phillip F. JehIe, Associate General Counsel, NARD, Hearings, 150.
30 Ibid. PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, ch. I, § 8 (1955).
31 Statement of Philip F. Jehle, Associate General Counsel, NARD, Hearings, 150; PRIN-
CIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, § 7 (1964) (as found in AMA Council Reports, VII).
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for his own convenience or for the purpose of supplementing his income," 2 and
then continued: "It is, however, the definite opinion of the... judicial council
that the ownership of a pharmacy . . . can, under certain conditions, become
unethical and contrary to the best interest of the public and the medical pro-
fession.""3 The use of the word "however" in the above-quoted passage con-
fuses the attempted clarification. The word implies that the council's statement
that doctors may not dispense drugs for their own profit did not flatly declare
this practice to be unethical although the import of the earlier language was
certainly to that effect. Thus there exists an apparent contradiction in the
council's "explanation."
In November of 1962, the chairman of the judicial council, Dr. George
A. Woodhouse, proposed a ban against doctor ownership of pharmacies. Oppo-
sition to the proposal was vigorous and it was killed in the reference committee.
When testifying about the fate of his proposal at the congressional hearings
Dr. Woodhouse commented that, ". .. they really ground me up pretty fine.
I looked like I had come out of a meat grinder." 4 In 1963 the house of delegates
of the AMA concurred in a statement of the judicial council which approved
physician-owned pharmacies. The council proclaimed: ". . . it cannot be con-
sidered unethical for a physician to own or operate a pharmacy provided there
is no exploitation of his patient."3 3  Today, section VII of the code of ethics
employs the same language it used in 1957.3
In attempting to regulate possible abuses of the doctor's prescription power, the
AMA, as indicated above, has ruled through its judicial council that the patient is
entitled to a free choice of pharmacists, and also to a copy of his prescription. 8
It is assumed that if the physician-owner lives up to the council's directives and
to the code of ethics, the patient's free choice will not be interfered with. This
is undoubtedly true when considered in light of some of the more notorious
methods of interference which have been considered. Nevertheless, tis pro-
nouncement leaves the door open for the practitioner to "persuade" his patient
to patronize a certain pharmacy through some more subtle method. Also, by
allowing doctor ownership "provided there is no exploitation of the patient,"
the association has established a vague standard which lends itself to varying
interpretations. When is a patient being exploited? Certainly it cannot be said
that he is being exploited merely because his physician owns the pharmacy at
which his prescription is filled. But neither can it be said that he is not being
exploited because, in accordance with AMA safeguards, he happens to receive
a copy of his prescription and seems to have a free choice of pharmacies. As
with all ethical problems, a gray area exists which -is difficult to define and
32 Statement of Phillip F. Jehle, Associate General Counsel, NARD, Hearings, 151. The
actual text of this AMA statement is not available.
33 Id. at 151.
34 Statement of Dr. George A. Woodhouse, Past Chairman, judicial Council, American
Medical Ass'n, Hearings, 122-23.
35' AMA COUNCIL REPORTS, 50.
36 Compare text accompanying note 31, supra, with PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, § 7
(1964) (as found in AMA COUNCIL REPORTS, VII).
37 AMA COUNCIL REPORTS, 5.
38 Id. at 6.
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determine, and which becomes even more ambiguous when general ethical
standards are applied.
The AMA's ambiguous position is even more puzzling when one
considers its stand on other forms of patient exploitation which are com-
parable to the problem of physician ownership in pharmacies. For example,
the basic principle that patient exploitation is contrary to the best interest of
the public and the medical profession has led the AMA to flatly prohibit any
physician ownership in a drug repackaging company,"0 and also to declare that
it is unethical for a physician to have a financial interest in a pharmaceutical
company "which he can control or does control while actively engaged in the
practice of medicine."4 It is inconsistent to say that it is unethical for a physician
in Coffeyville, Kansas, to own one per cent of the stock in a drug repackaging
company located in his area, but that it is entirely permissible for him to own
a drugstore in his own community. The evils which the above provisions were
intended to alleviate would seem to be closely analogous to the evils inherent
in physician-owned pharmacies.
Inconsistencies also arise when the AMA's position on fee splitting is con-
sidered. The 1955 edition of the Principles of Medical Ethics stated: "Fee
splitting violates the patient's trust that his physician will not exploit his depen-
dence upon him and invites physicians to place the desire for profits above the
opportunity to render appropriate medical service."'" Similarly, an opinion of
the AMA house of delegates in 1947 said: ". . . [The] doctor may receive
no profit other than payment for rendered medical services. Hence, it should be
apparent that no rebate of any kind, in any form or from any source can be
accepted .... They are, in every case, absolutely unethical."4 '
The AMA has gone to great lengths to prohibit almost every conceivable
form of fee splitting. To name a few instances, it has decreed that physicians
who conduct a group practice and divide their income equally instead of accord-
ing to the value of the services rendered by each are guilty of splitting fees.4
Similarly, physicians who pay a certain percentage of their fees to a hospital for
the utilization of its facilities are guilty of fee splitting.4 It is submitted that
physician ownership of a drugstore is just a sophisticated form of fee splitting.
When a patient purchases a prescription, a charge is levied as the retail price
of the drug, and a fee is added for the services of the pharmacist. Calling a
part of the total amount charged "profit" and handing it over to the physician-
owner does not change its basic character.
The inconsistencies do not cease here. The judicial council, in 1960, also
decided that:
The rental of space by a physician or group of physicians as a phar-
macy should be a fixed one. Were the rental to be based on the amount of
business, it might well be argued, and indeed be the case, that fee splitting
39 Id. at 51.
40 Ibid.
41 PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHIcs, ch. I, § 6 (1955).
42 AMA COUNCIL REPORTs, 45.
43 Id. at 46-47.
44 Id. at 47.
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existed. In addition, the temptation would be ever present for the doctor-
owner to encourage patients to take their prescriptions to that pharmacy.
The evils inherent in such practice are too obvious to be mentioned.
45
Thus, the AMA is placed in the anomalous position of holding that for
physicians to share in a percentage of the profits of a pharmacy, when such profits
assume the form of rent, is unethical for reasons "too obvious to mention," but
that physicians may own an entire pharmacy and take all of the profits without
violating any ethical standards.
Surely doctor-owned pharmacies are contrary to the spirit, if not the letter,
of these principles. The medical association of the state of Texas realized this
and prohibited the physician from having an interest in a pharmacy."6 However,
259 physicians in that state still own interests in some 117 pharmacies, largely
because the practice has not been disapproved by the national body of the AMA."
Perhaps the reasons for the AMA's reluctance to condemn this practice lie more
in politics than in ethics. There is a conflict of interest within the AMA as
within all professional organizations. This is the conflict between its responsi-
bilities to the public and its obligations to its own members.
3. The Codes of Ethics of the American Pharmaceutical Association and the
National Association of Retail Druggists
All states require a registered pharmacist to be in charge of the drug-
dispensing department of a drugstore. Therefore, before the physician can put
his pharmacy into operation he must hire a registered pharmacist as an employee.
Although prohibiting pharmacists from entering into such arrangements would
be an effective way of doing away with the physician's pharmacy, neither the
APhA nor the National Association of Retail Druggists48 has attempted to do so.
It is difficult to determine why these two organizations have not taken firmer
steps. One reason for their hesitancy is probably the fact that their member-
ship is not as vast as some other professional organizations, nor do they exercise
the authority over professional matters typical of other professional organizations.-
Another factor can be found in the fact that there -is no uniform code of ethics
for the profession of pharmacy. Also, these organizations may be more interested
in the larger problem of state legislation to restrict the ownership of pharmacies
to registered pharmacists49 and hence are not wasting much effort on the more
particular problem of physician ownership.
However, the NARD and the APhA have been negotiating with the AMA
45 Id. at 50. (Emphasis added.)
46 THE ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF PHYSICIAN OWNERSHIP OF PHARMACIES AND DRUG
COMPANIES, paper presented by Dr. James H. Sammons, AMA Institute, Chicago, 1962, Hear-
ings, 248-49.
47 Statement of Philip F. Jehle, Associate General Counsel, NARD, Hearings, 158.
48 Hereinafter denoted in the text as NARD.
49 The NARD, for example, has adopted a resolution authorizing a study of ways to bring
about the enactment of legislation to restrict the ownership of retail pharmacies to licensed
pharmacists. Letter and mimeograph enclosure entitled, "Suggested Material to Effectuate
Resolutions Adopted by NARD Conventions with Reference to - (A) Pharmacy Ownership
Legislation, (B) Code of Ethics." From Herman S. Waller, General Counsel, NARD, to the
NOTRE DAME LAWYER, March 24, 1965, on file in the office of the NOTRE DAME LAWYER.
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since 1954 to do something about the doctor-owned drugstore.5" A physician-
pharmacist code of understanding has also been drafted and submitted to the
AMA for approval. Section 7 of this Code states:
In the practice of medicine and in the practice of pharmacy a prac-
titioner should limit the source of his professional income to professional
services actually rendered by him, or under his supervision, to patients. His
fee should be -commensurate with the services rendered and the patient's
ability to pay. He should neither pay nor receive a commission for referral
of patients.51
This code of understanding would appear to be an initial step in doing away
with the problem although it does not expressly outlaw the practice. It is not
inconceivable that the AMA would support a NARD-APhA effort to limit the
ownership of drugstores to registered pharmacists and perhaps corporations
which already have licenses. It is probable that a great many physicians who
would agree that only a registered pharmacist should own a drugstore resent
the suggestion that everyone except a physician should be allowed to own one.
Negotiations between the representatives of the pharmacy profession and the
AMA representatives on, this subject would certainly seem to be desirable, and
advantageous to both professions.
III. State Attempts at Regulation
A. Liggett v. Baldridge
It has long been recognized that the state has the power to regulate pro-
fessions in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare. Accordingly,
state and federal regulations strictly control the practice of pharmacy by setting
standards for the quality of drugs and their proper dispensation. Presently, all
states require that the drug departments of pharmacies be under the control
of a registered pharmacist and that the dispensing be done by him or under
his direct supervision. Such regulations have repeatedly been held constitutional
as a valid exercise of the police power.2
As to the specific problem of pharmacy ownership which is herein involved,
state statutes which have attempted to prohibit anyone but a licensed pharmacist
from owning a drugstore have been declared unconstitutional on the grounds
that they are unreasonable and arbitrarily interfere with the nonpharmacist's
constitutional right to participate in the business of his choosing. In Liggett v.
Baldridge,5" the United States Supreme Court invalidated such a Pennsylvania
statute as violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of the four-
teenth amendment. The stumbling block for this enactment was the Court's
conception that the practice of pharmacy was more of a trade or occupation
than a profession. The Court conceded that a state may regulate the practice
50 Statement of Dr. William S. Apple, Executive Director, APhA, Hearings, 200-03.
51 Id. at 201.
52 See cases collected in Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1084 (1931).
53 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
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of pharmacy in matters which substantially relate to the public health and safety."4
It also realized that "ownership carries with it a responsibility which does much
to insure the proper practice of a profession when ownership is restricted to
those qualified to practice,""5 and that it was often not desirable to separate
responsibility and control from the ownership of the business which resulted
from a professional practice."5 However, the Court concluded that the mere
ownership of a drugstore "can have no real or substantial relation to the public
health....
Joined in dissent by Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Holmes asserted:
Argument has not been supposed to be necessary in order to show that the
divorce between the power of control and knowledge is an evil. The selling
of drugs and poisons calls for knowledge in a high degree, and Pennsyl-
vania after enacting a series of other safeguards has provided that in that
matter the divorce shall not be allowed. . . .The Constitution does not
make it a condition of preventive legislation that it should work a perfect
cure. It is enough if the questioned act has a manifest tendency to cure
or at least to make the evil less.58
Following the Liggett decision, similar statutes in other states were like-
wise declared unconstitutional." Since that 1928 opinion, however, the temper
of the Supreme Court has changed and the scope of constitutional authority
has broadened considerably. In the past thirty-seven years, state statutes which
surely would have fallen had the judicial view of the Liggett Court survived,
have been upheld. As the Court of Appeals of Maryland observed in a recent
opinion, ".... it [the Liggett case] has been seriously limited, if not completely
undermined."5 " The devitalization of the doctrine of Liggett v. Baldridge has
been followed in a few states by legislation restricting the ownership of phar-
macies to registered pharmacists or prohibiting physicians from owning phar-
macies. Whether these statutes will stand the test of constitutionality is still an
open question.
B. Current State Law
At least five states have statutes dealing with or affecting physician owner-
54 Id. at 111-12.
55 Id. at 107.
56 Ibid.
57 Id. at 113.
58 Id. at 114-15.
59 State v. People's Drug Stores, 36 Del. 120, 172 Ati. 257 (Gen'l Sess. 1934); Pratter v.
Lascoff, 261 N.Y. 509, 185 N.E. 716 (Per curiam), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 754 (1933).
60 Brooks v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, 233 Md. 98, 195 A.2d 728, 735
(1963). Many cases illustrate this change of attitude on the part of the Court. In Daniel v.
Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949), the Court upheld a South Carolina statute
which prohibited undertakers from serving as agents of life insurance companies for the sale of
funeral insurance - a statute closely analogous to that considered in the Liggett case - as a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. The Supreme Court also recently held that a
Kansas statute making it a misdemeanor to engage in the business of debt adjusting except as
incidental to the lawful practice of law did not violate the due process clause. Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
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ship of pharmacies." All of this legislation except the Michigan statute has
been passed within the last five years.
The Michigan statute62 was enacted in 1927, one year before the Liggett
decision, and it still remains the law of that state today. Since its passage, the
statute has never been challenged. Its effect is to limit the right to own a
pharmacy to registered pharmacists or corporations in which twenty-five percent
or more of the stock is owned by licensed pharmacists. In a 1950 opinion the
Attorney General of Michigan conceded that although this law would be de-
clared unconstitutional according to the logic of the Liggett Court, it would be
upheld today in either a state or federal court.6
Although the high court of Michigan has never had the opportunity to
decide the constitutionality of this particular statute, it has approved a some-
what similar statutory regulation affecting the practice of dentistry which made
it a crime for a person other than a licensed dentist to own a dental parlor.64
The North Dakota statute specifies that a permit to operate a pharmacy
can be issued only if the applicant is a registered pharmacist or a member of
a partnership in which each active member is a registered pharmacist, or a
corporation or association in which the majority of stock is owned by registered
pharmacists. 5 Like the Michigan law, this statute has never been tested.
The California enactment prohibits the pharmacy board from issuing new
pharmacy permits to physicians and requires all physicians to rid themselves
of any "membership, proprietary interest, or co-ownership" by June 1, 1967.6
This law does not prevent other nonpharmacists from owning an interest in a
pharmacy, nor does it prevent a doctor from leasing space in his building either
under a straight rent or a percentage of the gross income. 7
This enactment differs from the Pennsylvania statute declared unconstitu-
tional in the Liggett case in that it prohibits only physicians and surgeons from
owning pharmacies. In considering the constitutionality of this exclusion, one
might argue that the state legislature could reasonably conclude that it is in the
public welfare to prohibit practitioners of medicine who prescribe medicines
from having an interest in an establishment which fills prescriptions.
Both the Pennsylvania68 and the Maryland69 regulations in essence em-
power the state boards of pharmacy to suspend or revoke the license of a pharma-
cist for association as an employee, co-owner, or partner in any pharmacy in
which a medical practitioner has an interest and declare such association to be
unprofessional conduct.
The California, Maryland and Pennsylvania provisions can only be in-
terpreted as an implicit recognition of the evils inherent in the physician-owned
pharmacy, and represent an attempt on the part of those states to remedy the
problem.
61 See statutes cited note 6 supra.
62 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.771 (1956).
63 Op. MICH. ATT'Y GEN. No. 1193 (April 5, 1950).
64 People v. Carroll, 274 Mich. 451, 264 N.W. 861 (1936).
65 N.D. CENT. CODE 43-15-35(5) (Supp. 1965).
66 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 654.
67 Ibid.
68 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 390-5(9) (xii) (Supp. 1964).
69 MD. ANN. CoDE art. 43, § 266A(c) (4) (iii) (Supp. 1964).
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C. State Regulation of the Practice of Optometry
In conjunction with the problem of physician ownership of pharmacies,
it is interesting to consider the present status of the law regulating the practice
of the profession of optometry. The relationship between an optometrist"0 and
the optician on the one hand, and the physician and the pharmacist on the
other hand, is quite similar. Both the optometrist and the physician prescribe
devices or medicines as treatment for the ills which they diagnose. These devices
or medicines are ordinarily furnished by third parties. However, when the op-
tometrist or physician himself becomes somehow involved in the furnishing of
the prescribed articles, the danger of a sacrifice of medical competence and
responsibility for the sake of profit from sales of medical supplies is ever present.
It is this common danger to professional competence and integrity which makes
an analysis of the regulation of the optical industry useful in discussing the
physician-owned pharmacy problem. Admittedly the analogy is not perfect be-
cause ordinarily an optician hires an optometrist while the physician hires the
pharmacist. However, in both cases, the evil of the mixture of professional
obligation with the possibility of nonmedical commercial gain is present. Thus,
a consideration of legislative regulation of the optical profession may shed some
light on how to eliminate the evils of the physician-owned pharmacy.
There is a split of opinion among the states as to whether a corporation
or a nonoptometrist may be allowed to hire an optometrist and sell his services
to the public. 1 The primary interest in this question focuses upon arrangements
whereby opticians or optical companies hire a licensed optometrist and hold his
services out to the public in the same or nearby premises. Certainly such arrange-
ments place the seller of optical goods in a favored position to fill prescriptions
issued by the licensed optometrist, and present the same problems raised earlier
with relation to physician-owned pharmacies. Some states hold that any person or
corporation may hire an optometrist and hold his services out to the public so
long as the actual examining is done by the optometrist. 2 Many of these states
follow the Liggett rationale in holding that the identity of the employer of an
optometrist can have no relation to the public health, safety, and welfare. In other
states, statutes prohibiting a registered optometrist from becoming the servant
of unregistered individuals or corporations have been held constitutional.'
Courts in these states have held that such an arrangement permits the un-
licensed party to exercise control over the professional activities of the licensed
party, and that the separation of control and professional knowledge is an evil
which is detrimental to the public interest." Obviously, these courts recognize
70 An ophthalmologist is a physician who specializes in treating diseases of the eye; an op-
tometrist examines the eye for defects and prescribes correctional lenses or exercises but not
drugs or surgery; an optician grinds spectacle lenses to prescription and dispenses eyeglasses.
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1963).
71 See cases collected in Annot., 128 A.L.R. 585 (1940).
72 People v. Sterling Optical Co., 26 Misc.2d 412, 209 N.Y:S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct. 1960),
aff'd mem., 11 N.Y.2d 970, 229 N.Y.S.2d 419, 183 N.E.2d 698 (1962).
73 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1954); Kay Jewelry v. Board of
Registration in Optometry, 305 Mass. 581, 27 N.E.2d 1 (1940); McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass.
363, 10 N.E.2d 139 (1937).
74 McMurdo v. Getter, supra note 73, at 142; Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E. 419
(1938).
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that it would be beneficial to the public welfare if optometrists were not subject
to the control of unlicensed, unprofessional persons. As the Supreme Court of
South Carolina said in Ezell v. Ritholz:5
The ethics of any profession is [sic] based upon personal or individual
responsibility. One who practices a profession is respoinsible directly to his
patient or his client. Hence, he cannot properly act in the practice of his
vocation as an agent of a corporation or business partnership whose interests
in the very nature of the case are commercial in character.76
In holding that the state of Pennsylvania could prohibit a corporation from
practicing optometry through hired licensed optometrists, the United States
Supreme Court, in Neill v. Gimbel Bros.,7 stated:
One who practices a profession is apt to have less regard for profes-
sional ethics and to be less amenable to regulations for their enforcement
when he has no contractual obligations to the client, does not fix or re-
ceive the fees, and is under the control of an employer whose commercial
interest is in the volume of sales of merchandise affected by the prescrip-
tions of the employee-practitioner.7 8
In short, these courts have realized that when a professional practitioner such as
an optometrist is subjected to the control of an unprofessional employer and is
dependent upon him for compensation, it is possible that "the welfare of the
patient would not be the sole criterion applied by the optometrist in rendering
services to him." 7 9 Of special significance to the problem at hand is the statement
of some courts that the practicing optometrist should have no interest whatever
in the establishment which fills his prescriptions."0
No cases have been found dealing with the specific problem of the owner-
ship of an optical dispensing shop by an ophthalmologist or an optometrist. The
AMA's stand on this practice is the same as its position on physician ownership
of pharmacies, i.e., the practice is not improper provided there is "no exploita-
tion of the patient."'" The AMA also holds that an ophthalmologist may lease
space to an optician on a fixed rental basis in a medical building owned by the
ophthalmologist so long as patients are not "steered" to the optician.2
Prime targets for state legislation have been arrangements between optom-
etrists or ophthalmologists and opticians or optical companies in which the pres-
cribing practitioner is given a kickback or rebate of a percentage of the cost of
the prescribed optical products as a reward for patient referral.8 " Of course,
these fee-splitting arrangements are readily comparable to similar agreements
between physicians and pharmacists, and they have been declared "absolutely
75 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E. 419 (1938).
76 Id. at 424.
77 330 Pa. 213, 199 AtI. 178 (1938).
78 Id. at 182.
79 Lieberman v. Connecticut St. Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 130 Conn. 344, 34 A.2d
213 (1943).
80 Rowe v. Burt's, Inc., 31 N.E.2d 725, 727 (Ohio Ct. App. 1939). See also Neill v.
Gimbel Bros., 330 Pa. 213, 199 Atl. 178 (1938).
81 AMA COUNCIL REPORTs, 51.
82 Id. at 52.
83 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.57(3) (1946); OKcLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 944 (1963).
NOTES
unethical" by the AMA"4 and have also been forbidden by law in many states.85
In spite of these barriers, this practice became so widespread that the Federal
Trade Commission attempted to eliminate fee-splitting arrangements by regulat-
ing the optical products industry.8 6 The antitrust aspects of the problem of
physician ownership can best be understood by considering these regulations.
IV. Federal Regulation of the Optical Products Industry
In 1948, the Department of Justice initiated six separate class actions against
approximately 4,000 doctors who were discovered sharing profits connected
with the sale of optical products. In United States v. American Optical Co,"7
action was brought against an optical association, a corporation, and several
physicians and individuals, the latter as representatives of a class of some 2,000
oculists. The Government charged that the defendants had conspired to in-
fluence patients of the doctors to have their prescriptions filled by the optical
association's members, and that the latter added extra charges for fitting fees
and rebates to the physicians (usually one-half of the consumer price) to the
prevailing consumer rates, thereby restraining interstate trade in violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Defendants in the American case and the other five
actions submitted to a consent decree, whereupon the court enjoined the de-
fendant doctors from accepting, directly or indirectly, payments of any type
from any dispenser of optical goods, whether such dispenser acts as the agent
of the doctor or otherwise, and also enjoined the doctors from entering into any
agreement or plan whereby they would receive payments from any dispenser.88
These "Optical Rebating Cases" prompted the FTC to promulgate rules
for the optical products industry. 9 Section 192.7(b) of those rules, which is
very similar to the court's decree in the American Optical case, declares:
It is an unfair trade practice for any dispenser to make or give di-
rectly or indirectly, to any doctor (whether such dispenser acts or purports
to act as an agent of the doctor or otherwise), any payment arising out
of or connected with his (the dispenser's) sale or dispensing of eyeglasses
or contact' lenses to a patient of such doctor, whether such payment be in
the form of, or is described or regarded as, a rebate, credit, credit balance,
gift, dividend, participation in or share in profits, or otherwise; or for a
dispenser to enter into or participate in any agreement, understanding,
scheme, plan, or concert of action, with any doctor, or with any other party
or parties, which provides for, or facilitates, any such payments.90
These rules also prohibit the physician from tying in or, conditioning an eye
examination with the purchase of eyeglasses or contact lenses he may prescribe,
where there is a danger that such practice would substantially injure competi-
84 AMA COUNCIL REPORTS, 45.
85 See, e.g., statutes cited note 83 supra.
86 16 C.F.R. §§ 190.0-192.21 (Supp. 1965).
87 97 F.Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
88 Letters from Department of Justice to various doctors in response to inquiries concern-
ing the rules, as cited in Appendix to 16 C.F.R. §§ 192.0-192.21 (Supp. 1965).
89 16 C.F.RL §§ 192.0-192.21 (Supp. 1965).
90 16 '.F.R. § 192.7(b) (Supp. 1965).
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tion, "or create or tend to create a monopoly, at any competitive level in the
trade area or areas where the practice is employed."9 However, the doctor is
nevertheless permitted by the rules to dispense eyeglasses or contact lenses in
his own professional offices either by himself or through an employee.9"
The decisions in the "Optical Rebating Cases" and the FTC rules discussed
above were intended to eliminate fee-splitting practices. However, it is almost
certain that both would also prohibit a doctor from owning an interest in an
optical company engaged in dispensing. In the opinion of the Department of
Justice, stock investments by doctors in an optical company to which they direct
their patients and from which they receive dividends would be in violation of
the "Optical Rebating Judgments."93 The fact that the doctor owns all of the
optical dispensing establishment and receives all of the profits rather than stock
dividends would seem only to compound the violation.
From the antitrust standpoint, there is very little difference between a physi-
cian partaking in the profits from the sale of prescription eyeglasses or from the
sale of prescription drugs. If the FTC found it in the public interest to prohibit
all forms of payments between optical dispensers and doctors-even to the
point of prohibiting doctors from owning optical dispensing establishments-
might it not also be in the public interest to prohibit all payments between
pharmacists and physicians- even to the point of prohibiting doctor owner-
ship of pharmacies? It is submitted that the same factors which prompted the
FTC to take steps to strictly regulate the former are no less present in the latter
circumstances. However, before government regulation of physician-pharmacist
relationships can be considered, it will be necessary to consider the applicability
of the antitrust laws to the problem.
V. Possible Regulation of Physician Ownership in Pharmacies Under the
Federal Trade Commission Act
It is generally recognized that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to foster
free competition by prohibiting agreements or arrangements which tend to
hinder competition, create monopolies, or restrain trade. The basic theory
behind these laws is that many independent enterprises competing with one an-
other will afford the greatest stimulation to the economy and produce the best
in quality and service at the most reasonable cost.
The independent pharmacist is a competitor in an area of economic activity
in which the demand for his products and services is ultimately exercised not
by the consumer, but by the prescribing doctor. The doctor ideally is not his
competitor, but rather is a source of some of his prescription business. A physi-
cian entering the drug prescription market in competition with a pharmacist
enjoys many obvious advantages, as have been previously discussed. 4 Plainly,
if a sufficient number of physicians purchased their own pharmacies and "per-
91 16 C.F.R. § 192.7(c) (Supp. 1965).
92 Letters From Department of Justice to various doctors in response to inquiries con-
cerning the rules, as cited in Appendix to, 16 O.F.R. §§ 192.0-192.21 (Supp. 1965).
93 Ibid.
94 See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
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suaded" their patients to patronize their establishments, some independent phar-
macists would be driven out of business and free competition would suffer.
Hence, there is a real danger that if this practice is not regulated by some means
or other, the spirit of the antitrust laws will be frustrated.
The antitrust laws may be used only to regulate commercial activities
which take place in interstate or foreign commerce. It has been consistently held
that the prescription drug is an article of interstate commerce and therefore
subject to federal regulation.95 Although the pharmacist does perform a profes-
sional service, the sale of the drug itself is an "entrepreneurial" rather than a
professional activity."8 A distinction must be made between matters affecting
the practice of professions and matters of trade or commerce. Professional services
are essentially local in nature, and the fact that the pharmacist uses commodities
which have traveled in interstate commerce does not justify interference with
professional services. However, if the professional service can be separated
from the commercial transaction which accompanies it, the latter may be regu-
lated without interference with the former. For example, the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act98 has successfully regulated commodities in commerce without
affecting the practice of any profession. Similarly, the antitrust laws do not
prevent physicians from combining to fix fees for professional services, since
such services are not commodities or merchandise in interstate commerce.99
The profession of pharmacy has greatly affected mass production and modem
sales methods, and consequently, a very small percentage of the prescription
drugs sold today require some added "service" such as compounding before they
are passed on to the consumer."' In a very real sense, the pharmacist merely
acts as a "conduit" to deliver the drugs from the flow of interstate commerce
to the purchaser,' and thus seems to be more of a tradesman than a profes-
sional.
Thus, merely because prescription drugs are handled by a professional
pharmacist before they are sold to the consumer does not place them beyond
antitrust regulation. Courts have shown a willingness to strike down agreements
between pharmacists which unlawfully restrict free competition in interstate
trade. For example, agreements between pharmacists to fix the prices of drugs
as distinguished from fees for services have been struck down as violative of the
Sherman Act." 2 In one such case, Northern California Pharmaceutical Ass'n
v. United States,"'3 the Ninth Circuit explained: "We do not decide that every
95 Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 384 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); United, States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F.Supp.
29, 33 (D. Utah), aff'd 371 U.S. 24 (1962). Cf. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
96 Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n, supra note 95, at 385.
97 See, e.g., Spears Free Clinic v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125, 126 (10th Cir. 1952).
98 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-517 (1964).
99 United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah) (dictum),
aff'd, 371 U.S. 24 (1962); Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 140 Iowa 182, 118 N.W. 276 (1908).
100 United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, supra note 99, at 33 (setting the figure at
about 10%).
101 Id. at 33.
102 Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D.
Utah), aff'd, 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
103 Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, supra note 102.
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action of professionals is within the reach of the Sherman Act. We do decide
that an agreement among professionals to fix a commodity price is.,"'
Another question which must be considered in determining the applicability
of the antitrust laws to the present problem is whether the flow of interstate
commerce ceases when the prescription drug reaches the pharmacist's shelf,
thus making the sale to the consumer a wholly intrastate transaction. In the
Northern California Pharmaceutical Ass'n case, the court held that such a sale
took place in interstate rather than intrastate commerce."' 5 The court viewed
"interstate commerce" as a practical business concept which should not be the
subject of technical distinctions and found a "practical continuity of movement"
from the manufacturer to the consumer since "the undivided attention of manu-
facturer, warehouseman, wholesaler and retailer is upon the ultimate consumer
and his immediate aides, the physician and pharmacist...."106
It is clear then, that the pharmacist is no less subject to regulation under the
antitrust laws than any other retailer of commodities which have traveled in
interstate commerce and that pharmacists who monopolize, use unfair methods
of competition, or who in other ways restrain trade or commerce violate the anti-
trust laws. Similarly, physicians who purchase their own pharmacies and "steer"
their patients to these establishments hinder free competition between their phar-
macies and those owned by others. There would be no possibility of antitrust
violation if the methods used were completely fair. However, any physician
who carries on such practices is per se engaged in an unfair method of competition
vis-a-vis owners of competing pharmacies, because of his unique ability to
capitalize on the trust which his patient places in him.
To repeat, it is probably true that the majority of physicians who own
pharmacies do not use such unfair methods, i.e., steering patients to their
pharmacies. However, if present trends of physician ownership continue, the
number of unscrupulous physician-owners would correspondingly increase and
this very possibly could result in substantial interference with free competition.
Since it is extremely difficult to pinpoint and control some of the more subtle
methods the owner-physician may use to steer patients to his pharmacy, any
attempt at regulation under the antitrust laws short of outright prohibition of
such ownership would be fraught with difficulties. It is submitted that rules
similar to those established by the FTC to regulate the optical products industry
would be the most efficacious antitrust solution to the problem.
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the ultimate basis of the
optical products industry regulations, declares "unfair methods of competition"
and "unfair or deceptive acts in commerce" unlawful 0 ' This section is supple-
mentary to the Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts... and authorizes the Com-
mission to issue cease and desist orders when it is proven that a substantial
amount of present or potential competition is injured or threatened with injury
104 Id. at 386.
105 Id. at 387.
106 Ibid.
107 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
108 FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 (1931).
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because of the use of unfair competitive methods." Just what con-
stitutes "unfair methods of competition" is left without definition. "Congress
deemed it better to leave the subject without precise definition, and to have each
case determined upon its own facts, owing to the multifarious means by which
it is sought to effectuate such schemes.""' Before the Commission can issue
cease and desist orders or promulgate rules affecting a particular industry or
trade it must be determined: (1) that the methods complained of are unfair;
(2) that the methods are used in competition in commerce; and (3) that action
by the Commission will be in the interest of the public.." As to the latter require-
ment, the Court in FTC v. Klesner"2 explained:
To justify filing a complaint the public interest must be specific and
substantial. Often it is so, because the unfair method employed threatens
the existence of present or potential competition. Sometimes, because the
unfair method is being employed under circumstances which involve flagrant
oppression of the weak by the strong. Sometimes, because, although the
aggregate of the loss entailed may be so serious and widespread as to make
the matter one of public consequence, no private suit would be brought
to stop the unfair conduct, since the loss to each of the individuals affected
is too small to warrant it."13
It is submitted that the same considerations which prompted the FTC to
prohibit dispensers of optical products from making payments in any form to
the physician who prescribes their products -a prohibition which presumably
extends to prohibit the physician from sharing in the profits of an optical dis-
pensing company owned by him -are also present in the situation here under
discussion. Certainly, all of the prerequisites for FTC action exist. First, any
method used by the physician-owner to influence his patient to patronize his
pharmacy would have to be considered an unfair method of competition; the
physician is taking wrongful advantage of the confidence and trust the patient
places in him, and of his power to create the demand for the very commodities
which his own pharmacy sells. Second, the sale of a prescription drug is a trans-
action in interstate commerce," 4 and any unfair methods used in connection
with such sales would appear to be susceptible to antitrust regulation. Third,
the public will best be served if medical patients have a completely free choice
of pharmacies. The competition brought about by free choice of pharmacies
will necessarily result in better services at a lower cost to the consumer-patient
and to the general public.
However, any consideration of possible antitrust regulation in this area must
take into account the problem of the extent of the practices to be prohibited.
This problem of extent may prove to be the major stumbling block to regula-
tion in the present situation. The antitrust laws are most readily applied if the
interference with interstate commerce is direct, intentional, and substantial rather
109 Id. at 651; 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
110 FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922).
111 FTC v. Raladam Co, 283 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1931); FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28
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112 FTC v. Klesner, supra note 111.
113 Id. at 28.
114 See text accompanying note 95 supra.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
than indirect, unintentional, and remote." 5 Traditionally, courts will not find
violations of the antitrust laws unless a substantial amount of interstate com-
merce is affected by the restraints on competition complained of.' 0 The degree
of injury may not be "so insignificant as to call for the application of the maxim,
'de minimis non curat lex.' 11
The "de minimis" rule would appear to be the principal barrier in the way
of effective government regulation through the antitrust laws. The undesirable
effects of physician ownership result from the actions of many physicians acting
independently of one another. There is no conspiracy among these owners to
monopolize the prescription business. The interference with interstate commerce
which results when one physician uses unfair methods of competition to mon-
opolize his own prescription trade is so insignificant when compared to the
entire market as to certainly fall within the "de minimis" rule. Even a clinical
pharmacy which has a monopoly over the prescriptions of a large number of
doctors would fall within the rule because it is doubtful that the arrangement
would ever reach the size which would enable it to substantially interfere with
interstate commerce.
Moreover, even if the "de minimis" rule were not a barrier to regulation,
to bring suit against all of these physicians individually would be an impossible
task. The government would be required to file separate actions against each.
All could not be joined as class defendants because they act independently and
there is no common bond of illegality uniting them. The government was able
to successfully prosecute the "Optical Rebating Cases" by filing separate actions
against six large optical companies, and joining as class defendants in each case
the physicians who were receiving payments from these respective companies.
The suit against the American Optical Company, for example, alleged that the
company and approximately 2,000 doctors participated in concerted activity in
violation of the antitrust laws." s
Thus, it must be concluded that it is highly improbable that the govern-
ment could or would proceed against physicians who own pharmacies and
practice unfair methods of competition under the existing antitrust legislation.
Assuming, arguendo, that such practices are in violation of these laws, their effect,
when taken on an individual basis, would seem too insubstantial to warrant -
or allow - government interference. Thus, before the government could attempt
to eliminate these practices, new federal legislation would be necessary."
115 Levering & Garriques Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107 (1933); Spears Free Clinic v.
Cleere, 197 F.2d 125, 127 (10th Cir. 1952).
116 Ibid. See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 510 (1940); Industrial Ass'n
of San Francisco v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 80-82 (1925); Hopkins v. United States, 171
U.S. 578, 592 (1898).
117 Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, supra note 116, at 84. See Glenn
Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885, 889 (4th Cir. 1934); G. D. Searle & Co. v.
Institutional Drug Distribs., 151 F. Supp. 715, 724 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
118 United States v. American Optical Co., 97 F. Supp. 66, 67 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
119 Senator Phillip A. Hart, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly,
and the main proponent of federal regulation of physician-owned pharmacies, recently an-
nounced that he would sponsor a bill which would prevent doctors from making any profit
on the sale of medicines they prescribe for patients. The bill will also apply to ophthalmologists
who sell eyeglasses. South Bend Tribune, Sept. 27, 1965, p. 2, col. 4.
NOTES
VI. Conclusion
Due consideration of the present and potential dangers to free competition
and the subsistence of the independent pharmacist inherent in physician owner-
ship of pharmacies, compels the conclusion that there is but one effective means
to permanently eliminate these harmful effects -outright prohibition of physi-
cian ownership. There are three feasible methods for accomplishing this end.
The first is through restrictions imposed by the federal government-a pro-
cedure which would probably require new federal legislation. The second is
through prohibitory legislation passed by the individual state legislatures. The
third would require condemnation of this practice within the professions them-
selves. Of the three approaches, the last would certainly seem to be the most
efficacious. Any attempts at legislative prohibition would surely be opposed by
powerful lobbying interests. Moreover, such legislation would ultimately have
to withstand the test of constitutionality. Clearly, the simplest and most conclu-
sive means would be self-regulation by both the medical and pharmaceutical
professions. The problem is first and foremost, an ethical one.
Ideally, pharmacists should be free to manage and control their own pro-
fessional practices. Ideally, physicians and pharmacists should operate inde-
pendently of one another for the welfare of the patient. Ideally, professionals
should administer to the public with a spirit and dedication above the "morals
of the market place" and should put their professional obligations before their
desires for personal financial gain. Ideally, professions should require of their
members responsibilities and moral standards which are above the minimal
requirements of the law and should be capable of regulating the conduct of
their members without the necessity of outside interference. Unfortunately,
not all of these ideals have become reality. However, this is not a repudiation
of their strength or validity; they remain principles for which every physician,
pharmacist and their representative professional organizations should strive.
Physicians rightly resent the implication that they cannot be trusted to own
pharmacies and operate them without exploiting the public while the ordinary
businessman can. However, some practices may be demoralizing to the medi-
cal profession and shake the public confidence even though they are not pro-
hibited by law and in spite of the fact that the doctors engaged in these practices
maintain the highest professional standards. In these situations, the physician
has the added duty- not only to the public, but also to his own profession -
of avoiding the appearance of evil for the sake of professional honor and in-
tegrity. The ownership of a pharmacy by a physician is precisely the kind of
situation in which the appearance of evil should be avoided. The practice is
contrary to the entire spirit if not the letter of the Principles of Medical Ethics.
As we have seen, these principles presently provide that: (1) "physicians should
recognize and promote the practice of pharmacy as a profession"; .2 (2) "a
physician should limit the source of his professional income to medical services
actually rendered by him, or under his supervision, to his patients"; .2. (3) it
120 PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, ch. VIII, § 3 (1955).
121 PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, § 7 (1964) as found in AMA COUNCIL REPORTS,
VII).
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is unethical for a physician to receive a "kickback, rebate, loan, favor, or emolu-
ment" with or without the knowledge of the patient for the referral of the
patient to another physician;"I (4) "the acceptance of rebates on prescriptions
and appliances or of commissions from those who aid in the care of patients is
unethical";123 (5) sharing in the profits of a pharmacy through a rental based
on a percentage of the gross income is unethical. 24
Thus, the problem for the physician is one of compliance with the spirit
of these ethical principles and a readiness to forego the right to own a pharmacy
for the good of the profession. A further burden of leadership falls upon the
AMA to declare physician-owned pharmacies inconsistent with the Principles
of Medical Ethics and to resolve this inconsistency.
The profession of pharmacy has a similar obligation in this area. Before
pharmacy can hope to attain full professional status, it must take greater re-
sponsibility for the actions of pharmacists and exercise more control over its
members. Without a registered pharmacist to dispense the drugs, the physician
could not operate a pharmacy. Presently, pharmacy strongly supports state laws
which would allow only registered pharmacists to own a pharmacy. It hopes
to free the profession from the unfortunate aura of variety store commercialism
which oftimes surrounds it and accord to it the dignity which it should have.
It is submitted that an ethic prohibiting pharmacists from practicing in phar-
macies wholly or partially owned by physicians would be an important step in
this direction and would eliminate a practice which is detrimental to both
professions.
Martin F. Idzik
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